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MOTEL BLUES: INSPECTING PATEL’S IMPACT
ON THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
Casey Adams*

I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative inspections are a vital tool for agencies charged with
guarding public health and safety at all levels of government. Fire, health, sanitation,
building, and labor departments across the country rely on administrative inspections
to ensure that regulated entities comply with laws and rules. These agencies have
limited resources and may not be able to shoulder the burden of obtaining judicial
process for every routine inspection of the potentially thousands of entities they
regulate. In addition, the nature of the activity regulated may make random,
unannounced inspections necessary for effective oversight. But administrative
inspections clearly have a privacy dimension as well—after all, an inspection may
involve a uniformed agent of the government making demands to see documents or
access nonpublic areas, sometimes under threat of criminal penalties and always with
the specter of further enforcement action lingering in the background. Finding the
balance between these two competing interests—the government’s need to
effectively enforce its mandates and the regulated entity’s constitutional right to
privacy—animated a line of Supreme Court jurisprudence that resulted in the
development of a specialized doctrine on administrative searches. In 2015, the Court
decided City of Los Angeles v. Patel, a case that struck down an administrative
inspection statute—a version of which had been on the books for more than a
century—as facially violative of the Fourth Amendment.1 Since then, understanding
Patel’s effect on the law of administrative searches2 has become urgently important
for the governmental agencies that rely on these tools to carry out their
responsibilities and the legislatures that write statutes authorizing their use.
The full scope of Patel’s impact is not yet clear. At a minimum, the decision
restated and clarified the basic structure of administrative inspections: most will
require precompliance review of a demand before a neutral decisionmaker, while a
select few industries will merit a lower bar because they are closely regulated. So
far, the lower courts have tended to read Patel as having a limited impact on the
content of the tests for whether industries are closely regulated and whether
* Fordham University School of Law, 2019. My thanks to my former colleagues at the New York
City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection and Law Department for guiding me through my
first encounters with the law of administrative inspections. In particular, I thank Tamala Boyd for her
thoughtful feedback on this article.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
2. This Article uses the phrases “administrative search” and “administrative inspection”
interchangeably unless otherwise noted.
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inspection regimes for those industries are constitutionally sufficient. The most
immediate consequence of Patel may be that administrative agencies, regulated
entities, and lower courts are now on notice that all inspection regimes must be
rigorously evaluated against the appropriate standard, and that longevity of a
procedure will not insulate it against searching review. In that sense, the decision
tightens the bolts on existing doctrine rather than reinventing it.
This paper sketches the realized and potential impact on administrative
searches of Patel and its progeny in the lower courts. First, it examines the history
and background of the doctrine, tracing its development in the pre-Patel era. Next, it
reviews the Patel decision itself. Finally, it examines post-Patel cases in the circuit
courts and attempts to draw from them lessons and continuing questions for
legislatures and regulatory authorities.3
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects the public against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.”4 In the absence of a warrant, searches “are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment” unless they fall into one of “a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions to that general rule.”5 However, it has not always
been clear that the Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to civil, as opposed to
criminal, matters. In fact, some early cases explicitly denied that the Fourth
Amendment can be violated in a civil proceeding.6 This understanding of the Fourth
Amendment meant that state and local civil authorities had free rein to demand
access to books and records or even entry into private dwellings. In 1959, the
Supreme Court decided Frank v. State of Maryland, a case concerning just this type
of intrusion, that appeared to confirm the conclusion that civil inspections fall outside
the protective scope of the Fourth Amendment.7 Less than a decade later, the Court
reversed itself in Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco8
and See v. City of Seattle,9 kicking off a long-term process of doctrinal development
that laid the groundwork for Patel. That evolution picked up speed when the Court
3. It is important to remember that some activities that could be called “inspections” do not implicate
the full range of Fourth Amendment protections. For example, some agencies inspect businesses for things
that may be observable in areas open to any member of the public, like price listings, posted proof of
licensure, fire and safety signage, and various consumer-facing disclosures. This Article focuses on
searches or inspections that go beyond public areas or reach items, like papers, that are specifically
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and those are the activities I mean when I refer to “inspections.” The
full range of administrative inspections, however, is broader.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)).
6. See, e.g., In re Strouse, 23 F. Cas. 261, 261–62 (D. Nev. 1871) (“[I]t need only be remarked that
the fourth amendment . . . is applicable to criminal cases only.”); In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1299 (N.
D. Ga. 1869) (“[T]his is a civil proceeding, and in no wise does it partake of the character of a criminal
prosecution; no offense is charged against the Meadors. Therefore, in this proceeding, the fourth
amendment is not violated.”).
7. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
8. 387 U.S. 523, 528.
9. 387 U.S. 541, 542.
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began fashioning a special doctrine for closely regulated industries in Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States10 and United States v. Biswell,11 which culminated
in the comprehensive test laid out in New York v. Burger.12
A.

Frank v. Maryland

The dispute in Frank started with a complaint about vermin. Gentry,13 an
inspector for the Baltimore City Health Department, responded to a complaint about
rats infesting the basement of a local home.14 After inspecting the area, Gentry
discovered a house that was in an “extreme state of decay,” with a pile of “rodent
feces mixed with straw and trash and debris [of] approximately half a ton” located
near the rear.15 The owner of the house refused to allow Gentry inside, and was
subsequently arrested for violating a local statute that required owners or occupiers
of homes to permit entry to health inspectors, even in the absence of a warrant.16 The
owner then brought a facial challenge to the validity of the statute.
The Court concluded that Fourth Amendment protections did not apply.
Tracing the Fourth Amendment’s roots back to the pre-colonial era, the majority
opined that it really contained two protections: the “right to be secure from intrusion
into personal privacy” and “the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its
design the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of the state against
the individual.”17 The Court did not view the attempted administrative inspection as
treading upon either right. Rather, the attempted inspection was “merely to determine
whether conditions exist which the Baltimore Health Code proscribes . . . . No
evidence for criminal prosecution is sought to be seized.”18 It viewed the appellant’s
objections as an unreasonable assertion of an “absolute right to refuse consent for an
inspection designed and pursued solely for the protection of the community’s health,
even when the inspection is conducted with due regard for every convenience of time
and place.”19 The Court approvingly cited the safeguards and limitations of the
statute, and noted that “[i]nspection without a warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory
scheme for the general welfare . . . and not as a means of enforcing the law” had a
pedigree reaching back more than 200 years in Maryland.20
Observing that the need for administrative inspections was only likely to
grow with the size and importance of urban centers, the Court concluded that “the
nature of our society has not vitiated the need for inspections first thought necessary
158 years ago, nor has experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in
meeting this need by means that history and dominant public opinion have
10. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
11. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
12. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
13. The decision does not disclose Gentry’s first name.
14. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 361 (1959), overruled by Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 365.
18. Id. at 366.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 367.
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sanctioned.”21 The Court’s review of the particular protections in Baltimore’s statute
suggested that, in civil matters, a regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless
inspections could survive constitutional scrutiny so long as it was “hedged about
with safeguards designed to make the least possible demand on the
individual . . . and to cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy” as
weighed against the governmental purpose to be furthered and the burden on the
enforcing agency of obtaining a warrant in each case.22
In dissent, four justices sharply disagreed with the majority’s attempt to
carve out a new test for administrative inspections in civil cases. Justice Douglas
accused the majority of “cast[ing] a shadow over [the Fourth Amendment] guarantee
as respects searches and seizures in civil cases.”23 According to the dissenters,
exempting civil inspections from the full force of Fourth Amendment protections
would require “considerable editing and revision” of the amendment itself.24
Conducting his own review of history, Justice Douglas concluded that the framers
must have had in mind a long history of official intrusions aimed at stifling dissent
and nonconformity, including a specific line of “oppressive practices directed at the
press,” accomplished by both civil and criminal means.25 Accordingly, Justice
Douglas argued, “[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . has a much wider frame of reference
than mere criminal prosecutions.”26 The dissent also found the case at bar to be a
poor vehicle for resolving the issue, as the vast majority of people simply consented
to an inspection—indeed, the dissent claims that only one person a year, on average,
was prosecuted for failure to allow an inspection.27
B.

Camara, See, and Closely Regulated Industries

Less than a decade later, the advantage swung back toward the dissenters.
In Camara the Court expressly overruled Frank and inaugurated a new era of
administrative inspection jurisprudence.28 On the same day, the Court handed down
See, a case clarifying that this change would apply equally to private dwellings and
commercial premises.29 In Camara, the Court noted that Frank needed to be
reexamined because “more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain
and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of [administrative] inspection
techniques.”30
As in Frank, the dispute arose from a municipal inspector attempting to gain
access to a private dwelling without a warrant.31 The Court first recognized that
Frank “has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the
21. Id. at 372.
22. Id. at 367.
23. Id. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 376.
26. Id. at 377.
27. Id. at 384 (“One rebel a year . . . is not too great a price to pay for maintaining our guarantee of
civil rights in full vigor.”).
28. Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
29. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1967).
30. 387 U.S. at 525.
31. Id. at 526.
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rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”32 It
then rejected two of the pillars of the Frank opinion: first, that the scheme was
hedged about with safeguards and made few demands on the inspected, and second,
that a warrant requirement would be unworkable for the government agencies
charged with enforcing health and safety provisions.33 On the former contention the
Court pointed out that even where safeguards were in place and few demands made,
the person inspected must still decide whether to comply immediately or risk
criminal punishment for resisting.34 On the latter, the Court observed that “broad
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review” and that “[i]t has
nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could
not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant
requirement.”35 Ultimately, the Court held:
[A]dministrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a
warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put
forth in Frank v. State of Maryland and in other cases for
upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so
substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.36
The Court went on to clarify that while the Fourth Amendment requires that
warrants only issue upon probable cause, the content of that requirement differs
depending on the type of proceeding and the standard is likely to be lower in the case
of administrative inspections than criminal investigations.37 It also explicitly
preserved the ability for authorities to bypass a warrant requirement when another
Fourth Amendment exception applies, for example when exigent circumstances call
for prompt emergency action.38
The companion case, See, extended the holding of Camara to inspections
of commercial premises. In that case, the appellant violated an ordinance mandating
access by refusing entry to a representative of the Seattle Fire Department attempting
to inspect his storage warehouse business for compliance with the city’s fire code.39
The Court, recognizing that “governmental regulation of business enterprise has
mushroomed in recent years,” saw “no justification for . . . relaxing Fourth
Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement
of laws . . . for commercial premises.”40 Accordingly, the Court held that “minimal
limitations on administrative action . . . are constitutionally required in the case of

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 529.
Id. at 532–33.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 541 (1967).
Id. at 543.
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investigative entry upon commercial establishments.”41 The decision analogized
limitations on the scope of subpoenas seeking books and records—that the demand
be “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that
compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome”42—to establish the new limits on
warrants for entry without consent. Taken together, Camara and See made clear that
the ground had shifted in the world of administrative inspections. Going forward, a
warrant would be required for every inspection not covered by a well-established
Fourth Amendment exception, whether administrative or not.
Shortly after Camara and See, the Court took a step back toward the Frank
era with a pair of cases recognizing special applications of the Fourth Amendment
for certain types of industries. The first case, Colonnade, concerned a federal statute
that authorized agents of the Internal Revenue Service to demand entry to the
premises of retail liquor dealers and made it a criminal offense to refuse entry.43 The
Court reviewed the long history of warrantless inspections to enforce revenue laws,
both in the United States and in England, and concluded that “[t]he general rule laid
down in [See]—that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of
commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled
through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure—is therefore not applicable here.”44 The Court stated that the holding in
See “reflects this Nation’s traditions that are strongly opposed to using force without
definite authority to break down doors,” and distinguished the situation at bar by
observing that liquor dealers were “long subject to close supervision and inspection,”
and therefore in no danger of being surprised by a government agent acting under
uncertain authority.45
The second case, Biswell, concerned a federal statute that authorized agents
of the Treasury Department to demand entry onto the premises of federally licensed
firearms dealers.46 The Court recognized that regulation of firearms dealers was not
as deeply rooted in history as the regulation of liquor dealers examined in Colonnade,
but found that the compelling federal interest in the control of interstate commerce
in weapons required a similar result.47 The Court held that where “regulatory
inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat
to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a
warrant where specifically authorized by statute.”48 The combination of Colonnade
and Biswell made clear that some form of warrantless inspection regime, undergirded
by either a deeply rooted history of regulation, a compelling federal interest, or both,
had survived the shift from Frank to Camara and See.
The borders of this exception came into sharper relief with Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., a case that examined a broad statutory authorization for warrantless

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 545.
Id. at 544.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73–74 (1970).
Id. at 76 (quoting See, 387 U.S. at 545) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 77.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 317.
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inspections to enforce the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).49
The statute at issue empowered agents of the Secretary of Labor to search “the work
area of any employment facility within OSHA’s jurisdiction for safety hazards and
violations of OSHA regulations,” sweeping in a huge swath of federally regulated
employers.50 The government urged that the statute was lawful under Colonnade and
Biswell, which it argued stood for an exception to the Camara and See doctrine for
“pervasively regulated businesses.”51
The Court agreed that an exception had been recognized, but refused to
extend it to any business regulated by federal statute.52 Rather, the Court said, the
exception was restricted to “certain carefully defined classes of cases,” like liquor
and firearms dealers, where the history of pervasive regulation extinguished any
reasonable expectation of privacy: “when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a
business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of
governmental regulation.”53 The Court held that the government had failed to show
that there was a history of federal regulation of working conditions “of the order of
specificity and pervasiveness that OSHA mandates,” and therefore could not avail
itself of the Colonnade-Biswell exception.54 As it had in earlier cases, the Court flatly
rejected the argument that a warrant requirement would be too burdensome for the
government and undermine enforcement of the statute.55 Ultimately, the Court held
that the portions of OSHA that purported to authorize warrantless inspections were
unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.56 In the wake of Marshall, it
became clear that the Colonnade-Biswell exception was just that—an exception—
and that the Court would remain on guard lest it be allowed to swallow the rule.
C.

Doctrinal Refinement: New York v. Burger

In the following decade, the Court attempted to fit the Colonnade-Biswell
exception into a comprehensive doctrine. The opportunity came in New York v.
Burger, a case concerning a challenge to a state statute authorizing warrantless
inspections of licensed vehicle dismantling businesses, which was part of a
regulatory regime designed to deter the illegal trade in stolen auto parts.57 The Court
first recognized that the concept of “closely regulated businesses” is defined by a
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the business owner and so must be
measured by the “pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation.”58 The
opinion then laid out a three part test for warrantless inspections of closely regulated
businesses: (1) “there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest that informs the
regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made;” (2) “the warrantless

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

436 U.S. 307, 307 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 325.
482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987).
Id. at 701 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605–06 (1981)).
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inspections must be ‘necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme;” and (3) “the
statute’s inspection program . . . [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant.”59 Applying these standards, the Court held that because of
the comprehensive nature of the regulatory scheme and the similarity between
vehicle dismantling businesses and long-regulated businesses like junkyards and
secondhand dealers, vehicle dismantlers could be classed as closely regulated even
though most of the regulations were less than 20 years old.60
The first prong of the three-part test was satisfied by the government’s
substantial interest in controlling automobile theft.61 The second prong was satisfied
because the government could rationally conclude that regulating vehicle
dismantlers would deter automobile theft by reducing the availability of markets for
stolen vehicles and parts, and helping to “trace the origin and destination of vehicle
parts.”62 The inspections were also necessary to further the regulatory scheme
because a warrant requirement could alert a business owner of the government’s
interest and give him or her time to conceal any stolen parts.63 Finally, the third prong
was satisfied because the statute alerted business owners that inspections would take
place regularly, and therefore “the vehicle dismantler knows that the inspections to
which he [or she] is subject do not constitute discretionary acts by a government
official but are conducted pursuant to statute.”64 Additionally, the statute authorized
only limited inspections subject to time, place, and manner restrictions, which the
Court found to be “appropriate restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting
officers.”65
After Burger, any scheme operating under the Colonnade-Biswell
exception for closely regulated businesses would need to satisfy this three-part test.
Since then, Courts of Appeals have upheld regulatory schemes authorizing
warrantless inspections of, among other things, mining operations,66 coin-operated
gambling machines,67 commercial motor vehicles,68 fishing vessels,69 deer-breeding
ranches,70 manufacturers of veterinary drugs,71 and businesses that sell animals to
research facilities.72 Patel reached the Supreme Court against this background.73

59. Id. at 702–03.
60. Id. at 703.
61. Id. at 708.
62. Id. at 709.
63. Id. at 710.
64. Id. at 711.
65. Id.
66. LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2012).
67. Rivera-Corraliza v. Morales, 794 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).
68. United States v. Ponce-Aldona, 579 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2009).
69. Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1991).
70. Anderton v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t., 605 F. App’x 339 (5th Cir. 2015).
71. United States v. Argent Chem. Lab’ys., Inc., 93 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1996).
72. Hodgins v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 238 F.3d 421 (table), 2000 WL 1785733, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov.
20, 2000).
73. For another list of industries held to be closely regulated by Circuit Courts of Appeals, see City
of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 435–36 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
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III. PATEL
Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel owned and operated the Rio Palace Motor
Inn in Los Angeles, California.74 Like all motels in the city, their establishment was
subject to a local statute that required them to record certain information about guests
and their vehicles and make those records available to any officer of the Los Angeles
Police Department upon demand.75 In 2003, the Patels joined with other motel
owners to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourth
Amendment.76 The District Court declined to find the inspection statute facially
unconstitutional.77 Although it concluded that hotels and motels did not qualify as
closely regulated industries and therefore did not reach the three-prong Burger test,
the District Court found that this did not matter because the Patels had no “reasonable
expectation of privacy in registers created pursuant to a municipal mandate.”78
On review, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court’s decision. The court elaborated on the rationale used below, explaining that
motel owners must establish a protectable privacy interest in information by showing
a subjective expectation that is objectively reasonable, just as in other Fourth
Amendment cases.79 The decision noted that, generally, hotel registers are accessible
to the public at the front desk and therefore cannot give rise to a reasonable
expectation of privacy.80 However, the court also clarified that it was rejecting the
city’s argument that a business owner can never have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a document that is required to be kept, and made available for inspection
on demand, by statutory mandate.81 Indeed, the court observed that “[t]o hold
otherwise would allow the government to conduct warrantless searches just by
announcing that it can.”82 With no protectable privacy interest established, the court
declined to reach the Burger test.83
On an en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel’s decision.84
The en banc decision rejected the contention, relied upon by the District Court and
the Ninth Circuit panel, that the Patels were required to prove that they possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their guest registers before Fourth Amendment
protections could come into play.85 The court recognized that the registers were
“papers” specifically protected under the Fourth Amendment, no less than papers
stored in the desk of a private citizen’s home.86 So long as those papers could be
74. Joint Appendix at 75, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015) (No. 13-1175), 2014
WL 7205656, at *75.
75. Patel, 576 U.S. at 412–13.
76. Id.
77. Patel v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 05–1571 DSF, 2008 WL 4382755, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
5, 2008).
78. Id. at *3.
79. Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2012).
80. Id. at 1088.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1090.
84. Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
85. Id. at 1062.
86. Id.
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considered “private,” and were not exposed to the public or otherwise stripped of
Fourth Amendment protection by some action of the Patels, the analysis should
proceed to the reasonableness of the search.87 Finding that “no serious argument can
be made that the hotel industry has been subject to the kind of pervasive regulation
that would qualify it for treatment under the Burger line of cases,”88 the court noted
that the statute lacked the “essential procedural safeguard” of an opportunity for
precompliance review of a demand for inspection.89 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.90
Like Frank, Patel was decided by a closely divided Court in a 5 to 4 vote.91
Justice Kennedy joined Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg in an opinion authored
by Justice Sotomayor.92 The decision drew two dissents, one by Justice Scalia93 and
another by Justice Alito.94 This division is notable in light of the fact that the majority
opinion purports to be a straightforward, and narrow, application of the established
principles of law discussed above. The majority will be discussed first, followed by
Justice Scalia’s dissent. Justice Alito’s separate dissent, joined by Justice Thomas,
will not be discussed in detail because it focuses on the standard for holding a statute
facially unconstitutional.95
Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion held the Los Angeles statute facially
unconstitutional “because it fail[ed] to provide hotel operators with an opportunity
for precompliance review.”96 To reach this conclusion, the majority read See together
with Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., a case involving an administrative subpoena issued
by the Secretary of Labor in the course of enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act.97
That case distinguished between the administrative subpoena issued by the Secretary
of labor, which sought only the production of records, and the demands for entry into
nonpublic areas that were at issue in Camara and Marshall.98 The Court in Lone
Steer held that, where no entry is demanded, an administrative agency may compel
the production of records by an administrative subpoena rather than a judicial
warrant.99 The Patel majority applied this reasoning to conclude that some
opportunity for precompliance review, and not necessarily just by means of
administrative subpoenas, must be given where an agency seeks to conduct an
administrative inspection falling outside the Burger line of cases. Somewhat
confusingly, the majority refers to this as the “general administrative search
87. Id. at 1062–63.
88. Id. at 1064 n.2.
89. Id. at 1064–65 (“[the statute] is facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment insofar as it
authorizes inspections of [hotel registers] without affording an opportunity to ‘obtain judicial review of
the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.’”) (quoting See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967)).
90. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015).
91. Id. at 412.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 428–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 441–44 (Alito, J., dissenting).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 419.
97. 464 U.S. 408 (1984).
98. Id. at 414.
99. Id. at 415.
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doctrine,” a phrase usually used to refer to Burger cases, which the majority
discussed next.
The majority rejected the argument that hotels and motels are closely
regulated enough to qualify for Burger treatment. In the eyes of the majority,
classifying hotels as closely regulated “would permit what has always been a narrow
exception to swallow the rule.”100 The Court viewed Los Angeles’s statutory scheme
as similar to the provisions of OSHA that failed to qualify employers in interstate
commerce as closely regulated in Marshall.101 The “hodgepodge of regulations” on
hotels found in the historical record, some of which dated back to the eighteenth
century, failed to convince the Court that there was a comprehensive scheme
reaching the requisite level of pervasive regulation.102
The majority was similarly unconvinced that Los Angeles could satisfy the
Burger three-prong test even if it assumed that hotels were closely regulated.
Specifically, the Court found that the statute satisfied the first prong of Burger—the
existence of a substantial government interest—but failed the second and third
prongs: that warrantless inspections be necessary to further the interest and that the
scheme provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.103 The Court
rejected the argument that warrantless inspections were “necessary” because the use
of a warrant or other instrument of process would give operators an opportunity to
falsify records.104 Pointing back to Lone Steer, the Court emphasized that
administrative subpoenas, and possibly sequestration of requested records while a
demand is being challenged, would serve the same purposes as warrantless
inspections without the attendant risks of abuse.105 Finally, the Court found that the
statute in question did not provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant
in terms of the “certainty and regularity” of inspections.106 In one of the cloudier
portions of the opinion, the Court seemed to suggest that a statutory scheme must
include some form of regular inspection in order to put regulated entities on notice
and pass constitutional muster, though the bar could be as low as inspections
performed on a “regular basis.”107
Ultimately, the majority opinion reaffirmed the requirement that
administrative inspections, even those that seek access only books and records, must
provide some kind of legal process with a meaningful opportunity for precompliance
review before a neutral decisionmaker, though it need not always be by way of a
judicial warrant. The opinion’s impact on the content of the Burger test for
reasonableness of warrantless inspections of closely regulated businesses is less
clear, but it certainly called into question the general argument that warrantless
inspections can be termed “necessary” simply because notice of a demand gives the
recipient an opportunity to falsify or conceal requested information. There appears
to be some tension between the Patel majority’s view of this prong and the Burger
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Patel, 576 U.S. at 424–25.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427–28.
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opinion itself, which accepted a similar argument, stating that “surprise is crucial if
the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function
at all.”108 In any event, the majority’s discussion of Burger could be viewed as dicta,
since it declined to find that hotels are closely regulated and disposed of the case on
general Fourth Amendment grounds.
Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Roberts, disputed the majority’s conclusions both that hotels are not closely
regulated and that the regulatory scheme could not survive the Burger test even if
they were. Scalia’s dissent argues that the main factors bearing on whether a business
is closely regulated are the duration of the regulatory tradition, the
comprehensiveness of the regulatory regime, and the imposition of similar
regulations by other jurisdictions.109 The opinion surveyed a long history of state
regulation of public inns dating back to colonial times110 and argued that the
regulatory scheme at issue was “substantially more comprehensive than the
regulations governing junkyards in Burger, where licensing, inventory-recording,
and permit-posting requirements were found sufficient to qualify the industry as
closely regulated.”111 Finally, Justice Scalia pointed to a list of more than 100 similar
register-inspection regimes in cities and counties across the country to argue that
such regulations are widely imposed across different jurisdictions.112 Ultimately, the
dissenters concluded that closely regulated industries may be searched without a
warrant because of “the expectation of those who enter such a line of work,” and that
hotel operators were unquestionably on notice that this doctrine would apply to them.
Justice Scalia also argued that the statute satisfied all three prongs of the
Burger test. The governmental purpose was to deter criminal activities that
frequently take place in hotels, such as drug dealing, prostitution, and human
trafficking.113 Warrantless inspections were necessary to further the regulatory
scheme because hotel operators could alter or destroy records upon receiving a
demand and the operational burden on police departments of sequestering all such
records would be too great.114 Moreover, Scalia argued, the Burger test does not
require the government to choose the “least-restrictive-means” for conducting an
administrative search, only a reasonable one.115 Justice Scalia argued that the scheme
provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant because it restricted the
scope of any inspection to the four corners of the guest register, a narrower limitation
than those upheld earlier in the line of Burger cases.116 He also accused the court of
misreading Burger to conjure a frequency requirement that not only was not part of
that case’s holding, but in fact was not satisfied by the inspection regime it upheld
as constitutional. Ultimately, Scalia’s critique was that the Court was “mistaking
[Supreme Court] precedent for the Fourth Amendment itself” and losing sight of the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987).
Patel, 576 U.S. at 432 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 432–33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 436–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 438–39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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fundamental constitutional question of “whether the challenged search is
reasonable.”117
IV. POST-PATEL CASES
At the date of writing, six Circuit Courts of Appeal have meaningfully
discussed or applied Patel’s Fourth Amendment analysis.118 I discuss each in turn in
an attempt to tease out the borders of Patel’s impact.
A.

Early Cases: Rivera-Corraliza, Free Speech Coalition, and Bell

The first case, Rivera-Corraliza v. Morales, was handed down by the First
Circuit exactly one month after the Supreme Court decided Patel.119 The case
involved difficult qualified immunity questions and, because the events in question
took place before Patel was decided, the court concluded that it did not apply.120 The
court did, however, note that “the law governing administrative searches continues
to develop and that the bench and bar must be on the lookout for situations where
Patel does hold sway,” and made two observations relevant to that admonishment.121
First, the court said that it “need not decide whether Patel . . . changed the Burger
test in any way.”122 This, of course, leaves open both the substantive question and
the door for a later case where that question can or must be decided. Second, the
court suggested that the plaintiffs’ argument that an industry must be “inherently
dangerous to persons” to be considered a closely regulated industry, while not
persuasive in this case, might “have more traction [in future cases] given the Court’s
Patel decision,”123 which contained a footnote suggesting that closely regulated
industries are typically “intrinsically dangerous.”124
Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General involved a Third Circuit
challenge to various aspects of the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act
of 1988 and successor provisions which, among other things, required extensive
record keeping by producers of pornography in order to combat trafficking and
exploitation of underage models.125 The rules promulgated under the statute
authorized warrantless inspections of records kept pursuant to statutory mandate.126
The case had a complex procedural history—this decision was the third time it had
risen to the Third Circuit and the plaintiffs had already won an earlier as applied

117. Id. at 440–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Several Circuits have also cited Patel for its discussion of facial constitutional challenges to
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 937 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2019); Winston v. City of Syracuse,
887 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2018); City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 187 (5th Cir. 2018).
119. 794 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 217 n.12.
123. Id. at 219 n.16.
124. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424 n.5. (2015).
125. 825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter FS III].
126. See id. at 158.
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constitutional challenge to the regulations.127 In this third iteration of the case,
decided after Patel, the court expanded its analysis and held the inspection provisions
of the statutes themselves facially unconstitutional.128 To reach this conclusion, the
court first found that producers of pornography are not closely regulated because (1)
regulations of the industry are broad, not directly targeted; (2) producers are not
required to obtain a license or register with the government; and (3) the inspection
provisions themselves could not be relied upon to establish pervasive regulation
under Patel.129 Since the industry is not closely regulated, Patel allowed for no
administrative inspection without an opportunity for precompliance review before a
neutral decisionmaker. However, as in Patel, the court went on to detail why the
statute would fail the Burger test even if the industry were held to be closely
regulated. The court did not dispute that the government has a substantial interest in
combating trafficking and exploitation of underage models, but concluded that the
second prong of Burger was not satisfied and therefore the third prong need not be
reached. The court argued that warrantless inspections were not necessary because
the government showed no evidence of a need for the “element of surprise” and the
records concerned “could not easily be recreated on short notice nor could violations
be concealed.”130
The Seventh Circuit case Bell v. City of Chicago involved a local statute
that authorized the impoundment of vehicles involved in drug crimes.131 The court
flatly rejected appellants’ argument that Patel stands for “the proposition that a law
that permits warrantless seizures in all instances is facially unconstitutional.”132 It
distinguished the impoundment ordinance from Los Angeles’s hotel register
ordinance by noting that the latter “allowed the search to occur without probable
cause,” and concluded that “Patel did not . . . call into question the constitutionally
of . . . forfeiture statutes, which only allow for seizure of a vehicle after the officer
or state actor developed probable cause of a violation of the law.”133 The Supreme
Court denied review.134
B.

A Full Reckoning: Liberty Coins

The first appellate case to grapple in full with Patel’s teachings on the
Fourth Amendment was the Sixth Circuit decision Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman,
which resulted in the invalidation of portions of a statute regulating precious metal
dealers.135 Liberty Coins was also the first appellate case since Patel where an
industry was found to be closely regulated, giving the court occasion to explore
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Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 787 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2015).
FS III, 825 F.3d at 167.
Id. at 170–71.
Id. at 172.
835 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 741.
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Bell v. City of Chicago, 137 S. Ct. 1231 (2017) (Mem.).
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whether Patel in fact altered the Burger test. After concluding that the legislative
scheme provided no opportunity for precompliance review of inspection requests,
the court turned to the test for whether precious metal dealers are closely regulated.
The court recited the Burger test for close regulation—(1) pervasiveness and
regularity; (2) duration; and (3) comparable schemes in other states—and noted that
in Patel the Supreme Court “reiterated that closely regulated industries are the
“‘exception’” and suggested that businesses operating within these industries all pose
a clear and significant risk to the public welfare.”136
Ultimately, the court rejected appellees’ argument that “Patel significantly
narrowed the test for closely regulated industries” and concluded that precious
metals dealers should be considered closely regulated even after Patel.137 The court
recognized that “[w]hile Patel undoubtedly clarified the application of Burger,” it
did not institute a requirement that an industry be “ultra-hazardous” in order to be
considered closely regulated.138 Rather, the court read Patel’s focus on the
dangerousness of the industries recognized as closely regulated by the Supreme
Court—”liquor, firearms, mining, and automobile junkyards”—as going to an
“intrinsic danger” that presents a “clear and significant risk to the public welfare”
that need not be physical in nature.139 For example, the Patel Court recognized that
junkyards meet the requirement because they “‘provide[d] the major market for
stolen vehicles and vehicle parts.”‘140
Unfortunately for the state, the analysis did not end there. Turning to the
three-prong Burger test, the court engaged in a bifurcated analysis that reached
different results: First, it sustained two provisions requiring dealers to record and
make available to police records about articles sold and, upon demand, the articles
themselves (the “specific provisions”).141 Second, it struck down two provisions that
gave police broad discretion to inspect all of a dealer’s papers related to the conduct
of regulated business (the “broad provisions”).142 In both of these analyses, the court
136. Id. at 282 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424 (2015)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
137. Id. at 283.
138. Id. at 284.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Patel, 576 U.S. at 424).
141. Id. at 286–87, 289. “Each person licensed under Chapter 4728. of the Revised Code, shall, every
business day, make available to the chief or the head of the local police department, on forms furnished
by the police department, a description of all articles received by the licensee on the business day
immediately preceding, together with the number of the receipt issued.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4728.07
(West 2019–20); “Every person licensed under this chapter shall keep and use books and forms approved
by the superintendent of financial institutions, which shall disclose, at the time of each purchase, a full
and accurate description including identifying letters or marks thereon of the articles purchased, with the
name, age, place of residence, driver’s or commercial driver’s license number or other personal
identification, and a short physical description of the person of the seller. The licensee also shall write in
the book the name of the maker. The licensee shall keep the books in numerical order at all times at the
licensed location, open to the inspection of the superintendent or chief of or head of the local police
department, a police officer deputed by the chief or head of police, or the chief executive officer of the
political subdivision thereof. Upon demand of any of these officials, the licensee shall produce and show
an article thus listed and described which is in the licensee’s possession.” Id. § 4728.06.
142. Liberty Coins, 880 F.3d at 289–90. “The superintendent of financial institutions may, either
personally or by a person whom the superintendent appoints for that purpose, if the superintendent
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assumed that the government had a substantial interest in deterring the resale of
stolen goods.143 Throughout its analysis, the court made clear that it believed Patel
has wrought some lasting change on the content of the Burger test.
Writing on the necessity prong, the court mostly repeated the established
Burger test. Importantly, it cited Patel for the proposition that “simply seeking to
prevent falsification of records or looking to avoid administrative burdens will not
be sufficient to conduct a warrantless search.”144 The court reasoned that inspections
were necessary under the specific provisions because of the “fluid and transitory
nature of articles made of precious metals.”145 The court also noted the importance
of frequent warrantless inspections to the overall scheme’s ability to deter thieves
from stealing articles made of precious metals and motivate dealers to be more
careful about what articles they purchase.146 The opinion distinguished Patel by
observing that, in that case, Los Angeles relied solely on the need to prevent
falsification of records to justify warrantless inspections, when in fact it had other
methods available to achieve that goal.147 On the other hand, the court found that the
broad provisions were not necessary because the only stated justification was to
“ensure compliance,” a goal that, as in Patel, could be accomplished by
administrative subpoena or other methods.148
Next, the court examined whether the provisions provided a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant. The opinion describes this inquiry as containing
two parts: (1) whether a statute is comprehensive to the point that “businesses are on
notice that they will be subject to periodic searches of a properly defined scope,” and
(2) whether the discretion of inspecting officers is “carefully limited in time, place,
and scope.”149 While the court recognized that Patel found the lack of a “specific
temporal limitation”150 in Los Angeles’s statute to be “deficient,”151 it held that such

considers it advisable, investigate the business of every person licensed as a precious metals dealer under
this chapter, and of every person, partnership, and corporation by whom or for which any purchase is
made, whether the person, partnership, or corporation acts, or claims to act, as principal, agent, or broker,
or under, or without the authority of this chapter, and for that purpose shall have free access to the books
and papers thereof and other sources of information with regard to the business of the licensee or person
and whether the business has been or is being transacted in accordance with this chapter. The
superintendent and every examiner may examine, under oath or affirmation, any person whose testimony
may relate to any business coming within this chapter.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4728.05(A) (West 2019–
20), invalidated by Liberty Coins, 880 F.3d at 290; “Inspection of books and records: All books, forms,
and records, and all other sources of information with regard to the business of the licensee, shall at all
times be available for inspection by the division for the purpose of assuring that the business of the licensee
is being transacted in accordance with law. All purchased items shall be kept at the licensed location for
seventy-two hours from the time of purchase. All books, forms, records, etc., shall be kept at the licensed
location.” OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:8-6-03(D) (2014–15) (amended 2018).
143. Liberty Coins, 880 F.3d at 285.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 285
146. Id. at 287 (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 709 (1987)).
147. Id. at 288.
148. Id. at 290.
149. Id. at 285–85 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. Id. at 288.
151. Id. at 286.
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an absence was not “fatal”152 to the specific provisions. It held that the specific
provisions “establishe[d] a predictable and guided . . . regulatory presence” and
refused to find them unconstitutional because of missing “magic words” about the
regularity of inspections. 153 Conversely, the court felt that the broad provisions failed
this test because they were “too broad in scope.”154 This was so both because the
broad provisions applied to licensees and nonlicensees155 and because the
“seemingly unlimited” grant of unqualified access at all times failed to “sufficiently
constrain the discretion of the inspectors.”156
C.

Related Issues: Stemple and Sesay

Other recent cases in the Sixth Circuit suggest that housing and building
maintenance codes authorizing warrantless inspections remain on safe ground postPatel, so long as they provide meaningful precompliance review.157 In Benjamin v.
Stemple, the court upheld a local ordinance requiring owners of vacant properties to
register them with the city and consent to a warrantless search in the event that the
building is found to be dangerous.158 A preliminary finding of dangerousness
triggered a hearing process that allowed the property owner to contest the
determination before an inspection took place.159 The court noted the “many fairness
guarantees” built into this process: the appointment of a neutral hearing officer not
employed by the city, opportunity for testimony from both the inspector and property
owner, and the right of both parties to call and examine witnesses, introduce physical
evidence, conduct cross-examination, and be represented by counsel.160 The court
held that these facts satisfied the “minimal requirement” for precompliance review
before a neutral decisionmaker.161
The Eighth Circuit has clarified who may assert a challenge after Patel. In
United States v. Sesay, the court rejected an attempt by a motel guest to invoke
Patel’s protections to shield his registration from a warrantless search.162 The court
reasoned that the guest’s claim failed under the third-party doctrine163 because he
152. Id. at 288.
153. Id. at 288–89 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604 (1981)).
154. Id. at 291.
155. Certain businesses that bought and sold precious metals were exempt from licensure, e.g. jewelry
stores whose monthly precious metals purchases represented less than 25% of their total inventory. Id. at
277–78. The broad provisions applied to businesses even if they did not require a license.
156. Id. at 291.
157. Gardner v. Evans, 920 F.3d 1038, 1055 (6th Cir. 2019) (“We recently noted that one such
exception [to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement] is an ‘administrative search[ ] designed to
assure compliance with building codes, including codes designed to prevent buildings from becoming
dangerous to tenants and neighbors.’”) (quoting Benjamin v. Stemple, 915 F.3d 1066, 1069 (6th Cir.
2019)).
158. 915 F.3d at 1067–68.
159. Id. at 1070.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420 (2015)).
162. 937 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (8th Cir. 2019).
163. The third-party doctrine holds that a “‘person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he [or she] voluntarily turns over to third parties’ . . . ‘even if the information is revealed on
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had voluntarily turned over his information to the motel.164 According to the court,
Patel “did not hold that motel guests have a privacy interest in registration records;
to the contrary, the decision acknowledged that ‘hotel operators remain free to
consent to searches of their registries.’”165 Claims challenging warrantless
inspections must still be asserted by the business owner who has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in them.
D.

Diverging Paths Ahead? Hawley, Olson, and Zadeh

Some circuits have reaffirmed holdings reached under pre-Patel reasoning.
In Calzone v. Olson, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed an earlier holding in the same
matter that a Missouri statute authorizing warrantless inspections of commercial
vehicles by police was constitutional.166 The earlier case—Calzone v. Hawley—did
not mention Patel despite being decided after that case came down.167 Instead,
Hawley focused on applying the Burger test. The court held that “commercial
trucking” continues to be a closely regulated industry under past decisions.168 This
approach implicitly assumes that Patel had no impact on the Burger test for whether
an industry is closely regulated, or at least no impact deep enough to leave a mark
on the court’s analysis. The cases cited for the proposition that commercial trucking
is closely regulated mostly refer back to other cases without explaining their
reasoning.169 For example, United States v. Dominguez-Prieto concluded that
commercial trucking is closely regulated because extensive federal regulations
“cover driver’s qualifications, motor vehicles’ parts and accessories, reporting of
accidents, drivers’ hours of service, inspection, repair and maintenance of motor
vehicles, recording of itineraries, transportation of hazardous materials, and other
safety issues.”170
The Hawley court also determined that Missouri’s statute satisfied the threeprong Burger test. The court concluded that (1) the state has “a substantial interest
in ensuring the safety of motorists on its highways and in minimizing damage to the
highways from overweight vehicles,” (2) “effective enforcement would be nearly
impossible without impromptu, warrantless searches” because of the transitory
nature of commercial trucking, and (3) the statute contained a permissible substitute
for a warrant because it “provide[s] notice to commercial truck drivers of the
possibility of roadside inspection by a designated law enforcement officer, and []
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose’ . . . ‘As a result, the Government is typically
free to obtain such information from the recipient without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.’”
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).
164. United States v. Sesay, 937 F.3d 1146, 1152 (8th Cir. 2019).
165. Id. (quoting Patel, 576 U.S. at 423).
166. Calzone v. Olson, 931 F.3d 722, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2019).
167. 866 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017).
168. Id. at 871 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 569 F.3d 355, 356–57 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788,794 (8th Cir. 2004)).
169. See, e.g., Mendoza-Gonzalez, 363 F.3d 788 at 794 (concluding that “Commercial trucking is a
closely regulated industry within the meaning of Burger” without further elaboration and citing cases).
170. United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991).

Summer 2021

MOTEL BLUES

475

limit[s] the scope of the officer’s inspections to an examination solely for regulatory
compliance.”171
In Olson—which does cite Patel—the court quoted and reaffirmed its
conclusions from Hawley.172 The court also rejected the argument that the party
challenging the statute should not be subject to warrantless inspection because, as a
dump truck operator, he was exempt from “the lion’s share” of federal regulations
and therefore not closely regulated like other commercial truck companies.173 It
based this conclusion on the fact that Missouri regulations still apply to dump trucks
and “[b]y choosing to operate a heavy truck in furtherance of a commercial venture,
Calzone subjects himself to a pervasive regulatory scheme and has a reduced
expectation of privacy.”174
The Fifth Circuit confronted Patel in Zadeh v. Robinson.175 The case
involved a licensed doctor and owner of a medical practice who objected to a demand
for immediate compliance with an administrative subpoena by inspectors of the
Texas Medical Board.176 The inspectors served an assistant at Dr. Zadeh’s office with
a subpoena and threatened “disciplinary action” against the doctor’s license if the
assistant did not grant them access to patient records, which she eventually did.177
The state argued that the medical profession as a whole is closely regulated in Texas
under Burger and, therefore, the Board was not required to offer an opportunity for
precompliance review of its subpoenas.
The court rejected that argument.178 It stated that “[t]here is no doubt that
the medical profession is extensively regulated and has licensure requirements.
Satisfying the Burger doctrine requires more.”179 The court specifically pointed to
the requirements of pervasiveness and regularity of regulation as well as the duration
of the regulatory scheme.180 It noted that, outside of the licensure requirement, the
regulations cited by Texas did not “apply to the entire medical profession.”181
Instead, they targeted specific practices like prescribing controlled substances or
administering anesthesia.182 The court also observed an absence of an “entrenched
history of warrantless searches” of medical offices, which it explained was “relevant,
though not dispositive,” under Burger.183
The court then examined whether, assuming that pain management clinics
specifically are closely regulated, the Texas scheme could satisfy the three-prong
Burger test. It held that the first two Burger prongs were clearly satisfied but that the
regulatory scheme failed to provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866 at 871.
931 F.3d at 725.
Id.
Id. at 726.
928 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 462.
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Id. at 466.
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Id. at 466.

476

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 51; No. 2

warrant.184 The court held that both the Board’s subpoena authority and its random
inspection authorization suffered from the same “fatal Burger flaw . . . [because]
they did not limit how the clinics inspected are chosen.” In a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Willett argued that Patel had changed
the closely regulated industry test. He argued that a pre-Patel case finding that an
industry was closely regulated should not control because “the Supreme Court has
since clarified” the test in that decision.185
V. LESSONS AND CONTINUING QUESTIONS
Reading Patel together with its antecedents and its progeny yields some
possible insights and open questions. At a high level, the state of the law appears to
be that there is a “general administrative search doctrine”186 that allows governments
to conduct civil inspections under the authority of an administrative subpoena rather
than a judicial warrant, provided there is an “opportunity to obtain precompliance
review before a neutral decisionmaker.”187 Separately, there is a specialized doctrine
allowing warrantless inspections of closely regulated industries if the authorizing
statute meets the Burger three-prong test.188 One likely, and probably intended, effect
of Patel is that lower courts will more closely adhere to this general structure.
Patel may lead to courts applying a stricter version of the closely regulated
industry test. Judges may appreciate and apply the Supreme Court’s newly restated
directive that the closely regulated industry test, like the three-prong Burger test to
which it is the gateway, is something that courts “must jealously protect, lest this
particular warrantless-search exception destroy the Fourth Amendment.”189 It is less
clear whether Patel altered the substance of the closely regulated industry test. In
Liberty Coins, the Sixth Circuit backed away from reading Patel to impose an
“ultrahazardous conduct” requirement, as the First Circuit speculated in RiveraCorraliza might be the case. In Zadeh, the Fifth Circuit concluded that satisfying the
closely regulated industry test requires more than extensive regulation and licensing
requirements, albeit without explicitly stating whether it believed that this was a preexisting requirement or a change made by Patel. The Liberty Coins court seemed to
believe that Patel raised the bar for what should be considered a closely regulated
industry, while Judge Willett’s separate opinion in Zadeh expressly states that prePatel decisions holding an industry to be closely regulated should no longer be
considered controlling authority.190 However, Olson and Hawley demonstrate that
some courts might reach very different conclusions on this question.
A similar dynamic is at play in Patel’s impact on the three-prong Burger
test. While some parts of the inquiry appear to have been substantively sharpened by
Patel, the decision may be more important for its ability to impel the judiciary to
apply more scrutiny to administrative inspections. There is not much evidence that
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 467–68.
Id. at 475–76 (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424 (2015).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 424.
Rivera-Corraliza v. Morales, 794 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015).
See Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 475–76 (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Patel impacted the substantial government interest prong. Indeed, the Court
“assume[d that the] petitioner’s interest in ensuring that hotels maintain accurate and
complete registries” might satisfy this requirement.191 A substantial government
interest has been found in each of the Circuit cases that have reached this test:
protecting children against exploitation, deterring theft and resale of precious metals
articles, regulating the prescription of controlled substances, and ensuring the safety
of motorists on highways and minimizing roadway damage from overweight
vehicles.192 On the necessity prong, Patel seems to have settled substantive law by
establishing that an agency’s desire to avoid administrative burden or prevent
falsification of records are no longer sufficient justifications—standing alone—for
the necessity or warrantless inspections, a holding the Sixth Circuit applied in Liberty
Coins.193
The Patel decision initially appeared to modify the last Burger prong, but
its ultimate impact is still not clear. One of the biggest questions after Patel was
whether it had elevated the “certainty and regularity” portion of the constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant prong to the point of requiring specific limits on
timing and discretion in any statute authorizing warrantless inspections.194 In Liberty
Coins, the court found that the absence of a specific temporal limitation did not doom
the statute, and instead relied on the older conception of predictability of inspections
drawn from Donovan v. Dewey.195 In Zadeh, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that
the lack of a limitation on how inspectors chose targets was a “fatal flaw” under
Burger.196 The contours of Patel’s impact on the certainty and regularity prong of
Burger are still coming into focus. Interested observers should be on the lookout for
further development in this area.
Conversely, some courts may conclude that Patel had no effect at all on
Burger, either as to the closely regulated industry test or the three-prong test. That
seemed to be the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in Hawley and Olson, which
reaffirmed pre-Patel analyses under Burger. The Hawley and Olson decisions appear
191. Patel, 576 U.S. at 426. This could be read as a subtle misapplication of the Burger test. In Burger,
the test was stated as: “there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest that informs the regulatory
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made.” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (emphasis
added). Applying the test, the Court found that “the State has a substantial interest in regulating the
vehicle-dismantling and automobile-junkyard industry because motor vehicle theft has increased in the
State and because the problem of theft is associated with this industry.” Id. at 708. As Justice Scalia points
out, Los Angeles attempted to justify the inspection requirement for hotels by observing that “they are . . .
a particularly attractive site for criminal activity ranging from drug dealing and prostitution to human
trafficking.” Patel, 576 U.S. at 428–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The government interest in Patel is
therefore not in the keeping of accurate and complete registries at hotels, but in preventing hotels from
providing a venue for criminal activity.
192. FS III, 825 F.3d 149, 171 (3d Cir. 2016); Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 880 F.3d 274, 285
(6th Cir. 2018); Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 467; Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
193. Liberty Coins, 880 F.3d at 285.
194. “While the Court has upheld inspection schemes of closely regulated industries that called for at
least four times a year, or on a ‘regular basis,’ [the Los Angeles ordinance] imposes no comparable
standard.” Patel, 576 U.S. at 427–28 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604 (1981); Burger, 482
U.S. at 711).
195. 880 F.3d at 288–89.
196. 928 F.3d at 468.
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to be in substantial tension with Zadeh. The Olson court concluded that dump trucks
are closely regulated as “commercial vehicles,” despite the fact that they are
specifically exempted from the extensive federal regulatory scheme for those
vehicles.197 The Zadeh court took arguably the opposite approach, concluding that
the medical profession as a whole is not closely regulated despite an “extensive
regulatory scheme,” but that specific parts of it might be.198 Hawley concluded that
a statute providing for random stops and inspections of commercial vehicles on state
highways was an adequate substitute for a warrant because it “provide[s] notice to
commercial truck drivers of the possibility of roadside inspection by a designated
law enforcement officer, and [] limit[s] the scope of the officer’s inspections to an
examination solely for regulatory compliance.”199 But Zadeh held that it was a “fatal
flaw” under Burger that the authorizing statutes did not limit how the targets of
inspection are chosen.200 It is hard to square a blessing of purely random inspections
under Burger with a holding that a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant
must limit how officials choose targets. Whatever tension exists between these
approaches has not yet warranted Supreme Court attention—parties in both cases
petitioned for and were denied certiorari.201
Ultimately, Patel does not seem to have significantly altered the framework
questions administrative agencies and legislatures must ask themselves when
designing or reassessing an inspection regime: is there a precompliance review
mechanism in place and, if not, is this industry closely regulated? If it is, what
substantial government interest is being furthered, what is the justification for
needing warrantless inspections, and what safeguards are in place to constrain the
discretion of inspectors? The cases reviewed suggest that courts may scrutinize these
questions more closely than they did in the pre-Patel era. Courts have confirmed that
classic health and safety inspections that provide a meaningful opportunity for
precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker—like those examined in
Stemple—continue to be permissible after Patel. Other inspection practices should
be designed with a close eye on the Court’s recent teachings on both the general
administrative search doctrine and both Burger tests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patel sent up alarms in many quarters because it invalidated a statute that
city officials had applied and relied upon for decades. Closer analysis of the
decision—and its progeny in the lower courts—suggests that the decision was more
of a restatement and reinforcement of the law than a reinvention. Los Angeles’s
mistake was not designing an unconstitutional regime, but taking for granted that the
one it had on the books was constitutional. With Patel, the Court handed down both

197. Calzone v. Olson, 931 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2019).
198. 928 F.3d at 465–66.
199. Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2017).
200. 928 F.3d at 468.
201. Calzone v. Olson, 140 S. Ct. 955 (2020) (mem.) (denying certiorari); Zadeh v. Robinson, 141 S.
Ct. 110 (mem.) (denying certiorari). The justices made no statements respecting the reasons for denial
and, of course, “such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s views on the
merits of a case.” Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
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a toolbox for assessing administrative inspection regimes and an admonition that
these programs should be carefully reviewed.
Legislatures and administrative agencies should take note of the direction
of Supreme Court jurisprudence on administrative searches and act proactively.
Responding effectively will require these actors to both assess proposed inspection
tools more closely and reexamine the basis for older programs that may not withstand
renewed scrutiny. The cases reviewed above demonstrate that a system of
inspections is not insulated from constitutional scrutiny by the “long history of its
exercise.”202 After all, longevity was not enough to sustain the hotel inspection
regime in Patel.
Significant questions remain open after Patel. In cases like Olson and
Zadeh, circuit courts have sent mixed messages about whether Patel impacts either
the threshold or substantive tests of the Burger exception. Given that the Court has
declined to review these cases, entities involved in policing closely regulated
industries will have to pay close attention to how the law develops in their
jurisdiction.
Perhaps the enduring legacy of Patel will be that it inched up the bar for
what is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when it comes to administrative
inspections. After all, and as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, all the doctrinal
complexity emanating from the Colonnade-Biswell line of cases is ultimately a
judicial elaboration of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a search be
“reasonable.”

202. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959), overruled in part by Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F.,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).

